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Realism and Liberalism in the Naturalistic-Psychological Roots of 
Averroës Critique of Plato’s Republic 
 
This paper endeavors to achieve three main goals.  First it tries to contextualize Averroës’ 
main contribution to political philosophy as represented in his critical summary of Plato’s 
Republic.   Second, and more importantly, the paper investigates the grounds of 
Averroës’ critique of what he saw as the dialectical rather than demonstrative method in 
approaching the question of the possibility of attaining a perfect state and, in this vein, 
the relation between the perfect constitution and other degenerative forms of constitution 
that Plato puts forth in the Republic. Finally, the paper uses the transformation that takes 
place in Averroës’ psychology from the Long to the Middle Commentary on the De 
Anima to further elaborate on the scientific grounds of his critique of Plato and through 
this extrapolate his own political thought in a novel way.  
 
1. Averroës’ critical summary of Plato’s Republic in the general context of Muslim 
Political thought 
As numerous commentators have pointed out, Muslim political thought was forged under 
two main influences: the Persian and the Greek1.  The former, which tended to be more 
pervasive, particularly in the eastern part of the Muslim world, did not involve any real 
critical attempt at investigating political phenomena.  Rather, it mainly assumed the form 
of compendia about the protocols and manners of treating kings and in certain cases 
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advice to existing kings about how to best govern their subjects in order to further their 
rule. With the introduction of the Greek heritage in the first half of the ninth century, a 
different approach to the study of politics was presented. In this vein, the second key 
Muslim philosopher after al-Kīndī, Abu Nasr al-Fārābī was the first leading Muslim 
thinker to pay special attention to the ethical and political aspects of Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s thought. He composed numerous treatises on the nature of the perfect state, 
the connection between ethics, metaphysics and politics and civil politics.  In all of these 
writings, al-Fārābī devoted a considerable proportion of his efforts to show how a perfect 
state inspired by religion should be the same as one inspired by philosophy, and that the 
first ruler of the former, namely the prophet, and first ruler of the latter, viz., the 
philosopher king, should preach the same theoretical and practical doctrines.2 While the 
interest in reconciling religion and philosophy is also taken over by Averroës, a radical 
break from al-Fārābī, particularly in political philosophy, is made. Due to the prevalence 
of the Neo-Platonic influence on his thought, al-Fārābī was interested in politics as far as 
it is extrapolation or more precisely a concrete representation of the Platonic 
metaphysical system.  Averroës, due to the empirical and realistic orientation of his 
thought, which he more or less owes to Aristotle, was more interested investigating 
politics as a ramification of the study of man as a natural living substance.  Politics for 
Averroës, as he explicitly states in the introduction to his critical summary of Plato’s 
Republic, should properly be founded on psychology, psychology being the branch of 
physics concerned with the form of all animate substances and so man among them.3  
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However, this does not mean that Averroës was not concerned with reconciling the fruits 
of his philosophical inquiry with the general political schemata of Islam.  It is rather that 
his point of departure was different.  Such difference, in and of itself, led him to a more 
liberal and realistic view than that of al-Fārābī’s.   
  
Against this background the importance of Averroës commentary can be appreciated.  
Not only is it his key work on Plato but the fact that he wanted to construct Aristotle’s 
Politics, to which he had no access, based on a critique of Plato in light of Aristotle’s 
psychology and ethics and in light of the Muslim political context of his time —which 
was a time of great political turmoil and corruption4-- makes a unique doctrine that is 
most representative of Averroës own thought rather than his interpretation of Aristotle.  
 
2. The core of Averroës critical commentary on Plato’s Republic 
Unlike his commentaries on Aristotle, Averroës does not attempt to present a fully 
fledged account of Plato’s Republic. Rather, Averroës skips almost all of Books I and II 
of the Republic to focus on the core of the Platonic argument for a perfect city.  In 
addition Averroës devotes a huge part of his work to a discussion of the different types of 
governments and constitutions identified by Plato.  Though he adds a lot to Plato’s 
arguments about the nature of these different constitutions and how they degenerate into 
each other, Averroës continues to follow Plato’s argument in a rather strict sense. It is 
only towards the end of such discussion and the end of the whole book that Averroës 
starts to radically criticize Plato.  First, he criticizes Plato for claiming that the perfect 
city cannot be achieved on earth.  Subsequently, he writes: 
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What Plato has said is indubitably not necessary; it is rather what is most likely to 
happen. The reason is that any existing kind of constitution is bound to make the 
one evolving under its rule acquire certain characteristics… Since this is the case 
the transformation of the human behavior from one state to the other may follow 
the transformation of the constitution of the city…Necessity is only found in 
natural matter.5 
 
 
The last sentence provides the key to understanding Averroës critique of Plato.  Plato 
thought that the achievement of the perfect state was almost impossible and that the cycle 
of degeneration from one form of constitution to the other is bound to follow in the order 
he delineated because he did not realize that human matters are based on will rather than 
deterministically following rigid laws and rules like any other natural phenomenon.   
 
But one should immediately pose the following question: how come Averroës rejects the 
analysis of the human phenomenon in terms of a naturalistic perspective if he starts, as 
mentioned above, by saying that the roots proper of politics and ethics should be sought 
in physics and so the branch of physics that inquires into the nature of human living 
substances: De Anima? Would not the inquiry into psychology reveal the nature of the 
human substance in terms of necessary causal relation? Further would not these causal 
relations, once properly understood, tell us how man is bound to act and so allow us to 
draw a trajectory of the evolution of human societies? In order to respond to these 
problematic questions one thereby needs to refer to Averroës’ psychology.  The question 
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is which work on psychology. De Anima is among Aristotle’s key works on which 
Averroës composed three commentaries: short, middle and long. Each of these of 
commentaries, however, reflect a slightly different taking on the text—particularly the 
long and the middle commentaries—especially on the question of the material intellect 
which, as Alfred Ivry6 and Herbert Davidson7 rightly remark, constitutes the main focus 
of Averroës interpretation of the De Anima.  
 
Here I would like to propose resorting to the Middle Commentary.  A number of reasons 
underlie such a preference. First and most important, it has been decisively shown by 
Alfred Ivry and others that the Middle Commentary on the De Anima, contrary to the 
traditional view, was written after the Long Commentary on it, the text most known to the 
medieval West8.  Indeed Averroës refers to the latter several times in the former.  This 
means that it belongs to the last stage of Averroës’ life.  In parallelism to this claim, 
Muhammad ‘Ābid al-Jābrī has in a recent study argued, along the same line as Alfred 
Ivry, that Averroës critical commentary on Plato’s Republic was also composed around 
the same time towards the end of Averroës life. What supports this claim is not only the 
manuscript dates, but primarily the fact that it in several of its paragraphs, Averroës refers 
to his current political scene and the corruption he was witnessing let alone his own 
persecution and imprisonment.  For this reason, as one can easily glean from the text, 
Averroës criticizes Plato for claiming that the perfect state cannot be achieved in reality 
as he was calling upon people to try to make a change and oppose the tyranny prevalent 
in Andalusia at the time.  Further, in both texts there is an explicit interest in putting 
philosophy in direct dialogue with Muslim principles and convictions with the aim of 
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bringing about an actual reformation in the society. Against this background I may now 
turn to the Middle Commentary in an attempt to respond to the questions raised above.  
 
3. Averroës theory of the material intellect and realistic possibility of a perfect state  
As indicated above, Averroës, unlike his two key peripatetic forerunners, al-Fārābī and 
Avicenna, was consistently concerned with the place and role of the material intellect (al-
‘ql al-Hyūlānī) and its relation to the Agent intellect.  In the long commentary on the De 
Anima, Averroës treats the Agent intellect and material intellect as two separate 
hypostases. In the Middle Commentary, the picture radically changes.  The material 
intellect, which for Averroës represents the form proper of the human being in actuality 
since it is the faculty the actualization of which allows one to attain the highest 
perfection, is completely re-defined.  Like Avicenna in his characterization of the rational 
soul, Averroës goes back to the internal senses (al-Hawās al-Bātina).  In this vein 
Averroës argues that the material intellect is actualized through the aid of the purposive 
inclination of the faculty of imagination to become rational and get connected with the 
Agent Intellect. Once the material intellect is actualized in thinking and contemplation it 
can, though in an intermittent fashion, attain perfection by uniting with the Agent Active 
Intellect. Accordingly, the middle intellect is an intermediary stage between pure thought 
thinking itself or what can be described, using a more modern Kantian inspired 
terminology, as a rational transcendent self on the one hand, and an empirical self that is 
synthesized through imagination out of experience and that strives to be rationally 
actualized on the other hand.  But how can this theory of the material intellect respond to 
the above dilemma regarding the tenability of Averroës’ criticism of Plato’s 
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deterministically degenerative transformation from one constitution to the other and his 
radical skepticism about the possibility of achieving a perfect state?  
 
In response to these questions I propose the following answers.  As for his conviction of 
the possibility of attaining the perfect state, Averroës seems to have a different 
conception of the perfect state from that of Plato. Averroës’ perfect state is not a state 
achieved by those who are in a constant state of meditating the forms.  Plato himself was 
aware of this problem and so presented it as one of Glaucon’s challenges to Socrates. By 
contrast, Averroës, who both in his Middle Commentary on the De Anima and the Long 
Commentary on Metaphysics asserts that no one can maintain the transcendent state of 
thought thinking itself except on a very sporadic basis, would argue that the perfect state 
could be established by someone who, given his theory of the material intellect, is 
constantly striving to connect his two senses of the self or ‘we’s’ as Plotinus would argue 
in Enneads I.1. The psychological ground upon which Averroës bases his view of the 
perfect state is more realistic in the sense that perfection is measured by the degree to 
which one can actualize his rationality.  He does not thus set a farfetched metaphysical 
model of perfection based on purely abstract thought.  By contrast he defines perfection, 
if his theory of the material intellect is properly incorporated into his political thought, in 
terms of a realistic struggle to relate to and concretely bring into being the pure 
transcendent norms of reason in the immanence of concrete experience. Perfection is thus 
set and defined within the limits of what is essentially humanly possible.  The perfect 
state is thereby a state wherein all citizens are in constant strife to actualize their full 
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rationality in their everyday lives; inasmuch as they persist in this strife they approach the 
perfection of their humanity.   
 
This leads us to the answer to the second question regarding the relation between the 
different forms of the constitution.  Averroës theory of the material intellect in the Middle 
Commentary is essentially a more liberal theory than that of Plato’s.  First of all it 
overcomes the problem of the myth of metals in which al-Fārābī9 was also stuck, namely, 
seeking or waiting for the gold factions of the society to assume power and govern the 
bronze and silver ones.  Alternatively, the theory of the material intellect as it is 
represented in the Middle Commentary depicts the human condition as essentially a 
condition of striving to relate the transcendent rational dimension of our humanity to the 
empirical sensual one.  It thus advocates an egalitarian view of the human condition.  The 
citizens of any state start from an almost equal condition.  Then, based on their strife to 
relate the rational forms and ideas of their reason to their empirical realities, they can 
approach the state of perfection.  Accordingly, the key factor in determining the evolution 
of a state into a better form or its degeneration into a worse one is not the naturalistic 
determinism of the existence of gold or perfect citizens.  Rather, the key factor in 
determining social progress or regress is the will and intention of the totality of the 
citizens of the state to strife for the actualization of their humanity by applying the 
transcendent rational principles of reason into the immanence of their lives. This view 
thus overcomes the implied determinism of Plato’s theory of constitutions in the 
Republic.   
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